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ABSTRACT 
 
GREAT POWERS AND POLAND: 
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS 
BEHIND THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND 
 
 
Çelikkaya, Muhammed. 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
September 2014 
 
 
 
 This study aims to analyze the factors behind the first partition of Poland 
in 1772. The interaction of the national dynamics of Poland and the balance of 
power in Eastern Europe during the period from the election of Poniatowski in 
1764 with Russian and Prussian support until the first partition of Poland will be 
examined. The occurence of the Polish nationalist reaction with the Russian and 
Prussian interference into Poland’s internal affairs will be analyzed. The 
internationalization of the Polish problem with the start of the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1768-1774, which occured through the spread of Polish civil war to 
neighboring countries will be assessed. The diplomatic maneouvring of the other 
two powers of Eastern Europe, Austria and Prussia, on the course of the Russo-
Ottoman War will be emphasized. It enquire how it was that  factors of regional 
balancing culminated in the first partition of Poland. 
Keywords: First Partition of Poland, Balance of Power, Eastern Europe. 
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ÖZET 
 
BÜYÜK GÜÇLER VE POLONYA: 
POLONYA’NIN İLK TAKSİMİNİN ARDINDAKİ ULUSAL VE 
ULUSLARARASI DİNAMİKLER 
 
 
Çelikkaya, Muhammed. 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Doçent Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
 
 
 Bu çalışma, Polonya’nın Prusya, Rusya ve Avusturya tarafından 1772 
yılında gerçekleştirilen ilk taksimindeki etmenleri incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 
Poniatowski’nin 1764 yılında Rusya ve Prusya’nın desteğiyle Polonya Kralı 
seçilmesinden Polonya’nın ilk taksimine kadar olan dönemde Polonya’nın iç 
dinamikleri ile Doğu Avrupa’daki güçler dengesi arasındaki etkileşim 
irdelenecektir. Rusya ve Prusya’nın Polonya içişlerine müdahalesiyle Polonya’da 
ortaya çıkan milliyetçi reaksiyonun oluşumuna değinilecektir. Polonya’da yaşanan 
iç savaşın çevre ülkelere sıçrayarak neden olduğu Osmanlı-Rus Savaşının, Leh 
sorununu nasıl uluslararasılaştığı incelenecektir. Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı süresince, 
Doğu Avrupa’nın diğer iki büyük devleti Prusya ve Avusturya’nın diplomatik 
manevraları ele alınacaktır. Bölgedeki güçler dengesinin Polonya’nın taksimine 
nasıl neden olduğu sorgulanacaktır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Polonya’nın İlk Taksimi, Güçler Dengesi, Doğu Avrupa.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“I reflect with dread upon the perils which surround us. What forces 
have we to resist our neighbors? Do we trust to the faith of treaties? 
(…) We imagine that our neighbors are interested in our preservation 
by their mutual jealousies, a vain prejudice which deceives us, a 
ridiculous infatuation, which (…) will surely deprive us of ours 
[liberty] (…) Our turn will come, no doubt, and either we shall be the 
prey of some famous conqueror or the neighboring Powers will 
combine to divide our States”. 
 
Stanisław Leszczyński1 
 
 
 Any diplomatic historian in Turkey writing about 18th century Turkish – 
Polish relations, is bound to think of the famous sentence said to have been 
uttered by the Ottoman chiefs of protocol in the following century: “Has the legate 
of Lechistan arrived?”2 This thesis is no exception. 
                                                 
1 Stanisław Leszczyński was the king of Poland between 1733-1736. James Fletcher, The History 
of Poland from the Earliest to the Present Time, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835), 209. 
2 Norman Davies, Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland’s Present, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 304. 
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 The Ottoman Empire was perhaps the only country in Eastern Europe 
which had a direct interest in seeing Poland’s survival. Ottoman Polish relations 
went back over three and a half centuries at the time of the First Partition, indeed 
this year (2014) marks the 600th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Turkey and Poland. In 1414, two envoys from Poland visited 
Mehmet Çelebi, who was then on the Ottoman throne.3 Poland was the country 
that sent the highest number of envoys to the Porte4 before the abolition of the 
Polish State. Turkey was directly involved and vehemently opposed to the 
partitions, and never recognized the final partition and extinction of Poland, 
enabling the ancient neighbors today to claim continuous diplomatic relations 
over 600 years. 
 The Ottoman Empire was not one of the countries which threatened Poland 
in the eighteenth century. Three mighty eighteenth century monarchies, Russia, 
Prussia and Austria, surrounded the geographically doomed, hard-to-defend 
territories of Poland. No other European large state had to contend with three 
much more powerful neighbors at once. Furthermore the Kingdom of Poland 
lacked anything which could be called natural boundaries apart from its Baltic 
Coast in the north and the Carpathian Mountains to its south.  These facts of 
geography were one of the reasons of the partition of Poland. Yet, they fail to 
explain fully why its neighbors were able to dismember a state bigger than France 
without having first gone to war with it and without bloodshed among themselves 
after three separate acts of partition.  
       Poland’s three adversaries were powerful autocratic monarchies, playing a 
                                                 
3 Jan Dlugosz, The Annals of Jan Dlugosz Annales seu cronicae incliti regni Poloniae, an English 
Abridgement, trans. Michae Maurie, (Chichester: IM Publications, 1997), 419. 
4 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi Vol. 2, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 481. 
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complex power game between them which was going to persist until World War 
One. One of them, Austria, had been a first-rank European power for several 
centuries but was now less dynamic and in some respects even beginning to be on 
the defensive – as will be seen in its unenthusiastic attitude towards the First 
Partition. The other two, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Russian Empire were 
both expansionary or ‘revisionist’ powers which, by the mid-18th century, were 
eager to exploit any opportunities they could find. Prussia was basically content to 
live with a mosaic of neighbors in what is now Germany and was not large or 
strong enough to challenge its Habsburg neighbors. Poland, and particularly 
Danzig, offered the main opportunities.  
      Russia, with its vast territory and its Byzantine and Roman imperial 
pretensions, was a country which was remote from the power centers of Western 
Europe and faced relatively weak neighbors on three sides. Russia had no Great 
Power rivals in the 18th century when it expanded south into Ottoman territories. 
However, the process of expansion was a slow one. The Russian Empire was itself 
a much weaker and less developed state than the big powers of Western Europe 
and it had only limited military resources to deploy. So its expansion happened in 
bursts and it could not easily cope with war on two fronts at once, e.g. Poland and 
the Ottomans.  
        As a nominally independent satellite, Poland remained problematic, liable to 
internal upheavals and possible attempts to detach itself from Russian domination. 
One great advantage of absorbing its territories through partition for Russia was 
that they could be directly administered and policed.  
      Austria, Prussia and Russia partitioned Poland for the first time in 1772, 
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leading to its final demise only less than thirty years after the first partition. The 
collapse of a national state in Poland during the 18th century  as a result of 
partition by three powerful neighbours is a unique episode in European history. 
The break-up of Poland was a sui generis event for Europe, possible only under 
the particular circumstances of the 18th century and the particular sequence in 
which they took place. 
 The factors leading to Poland’s partition may be roughly reduced to two 
headings. The first consists of Poland’s internal weaknesses, as a result of the 
political evolution of the state. A weak central administration, always under the 
influence of a strong and selfish nobility that was not willing to share its power in 
governance, the ‘Noble Democracy’ as it was called, coupled with the limited size 
of the army in comparison with the armies of the neighboring countries led the 
Republic to fall prey to its neighbors. The inability and selfishness of the ruling 
Polish nobility, the szlachta, and szlachta’s infamous liberum veto, and the “right 
to resist”, i.e the right to organize armed confederations in order to fight against a 
government that was thought to be unjust, coupled with weak central 
administration led to disorder, chaos and eventually civil wars, known as the 
“Polish anarchy” and made Poland unable to keep up with the changes of 18th 
century European power politics and respond to it. But this explanation, though 
related and important, is too simple and too general to answer the questions of 
how or why the first partition happened or if there was any other alternative than 
the partition. 
 The second category of factors leading to Poland’s partition was related to 
the balance of power system in Eastern Europe in general and the politics of its 
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neighbors resulting from this system. The simultaneous decline of Poland and 
Sweden at the beginning of the century, the French focus on Great Britain rather 
than Eastern Europe especially after the Seven Years’ Wars, left Russia, Prussia 
and Austria as the only pillars of the delicate balance of power system in the 
region.  
 The preservation of the balance between these three countries was 
considered by them to be vital. The common view of how to preserve this balance 
was simple: none of these three powers would allow the other to become the 
hegemonic power in the region. Any unilateral gain by one country had to be 
counter-balanced by the other two through a bargaining process. So this thesis will 
look at how the First Partition happened and the working of the international 
system which produced this outcome, studying the interaction of Poland’s internal 
weaknesses (such as its institutions, its nobility, the Sejm, and the Liberum Veto) 
and its failure in the early 18th century to build a strong centralized absolute 
monarchy, and consider how these interacted dynamically with the European 
Great Power Politics to produce a downwards vortex from which Poland could not 
escape. It will show how its efforts at reform and resistance to outside interference 
only made its situation worse. 
 In this thesis, it is argued that the partitions and the eventual destruction of 
Poland were the result of the counter-balancing politics of Austria and Prussia 
against Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-
Turkish War of 1768 and that this occurred precisely because of the 
internationalization of the Polish problem. Yet the confusing developments of the 
first partition cannot be properly understood unless we consider the fact that 
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Poland’s internal weaknesses were systematically exploited by her neighbors on 
the course of the balancing politics. 
 So the politics of balance by the Eastern European powers, beginning from 
the Polish royal election in 1764 up until the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 
1768-1774, will be analyzed within the perspective of the balancing politics of 
Poland’s neighbors. This study divides the process of the First Partition of Poland 
into two phases.  
 A preliminary chapter on Eastern Europe in the decades before the run up 
to the partition will examine the development of the five countries involved—
Russia growing stronger and more internationally assertive after the reign of Peter 
the Great but delayed by the weakness of his immediate successors, Austria still in 
the front league of European powers but now relatively sidelined by the global 
expansion of France and England; Poland failing to achieve reforms and also a 
bystander to developments in Europe; and  Prussia, coming from relative 
obscurity to become a first class European  power with formidable and growing 
military strength. It was Poland’s failure to progress while its immediate 
neighbors grew ever stronger which was the source of its vulnerability, lack of 
prestige, and eventual loss of independence. A similar story is also true of the 
Ottoman Empire, still able to inflict defeats on Russia in the Ukraine in the early 
part of the 18th century but gradually falling behind. Though it experimented with 
military reforms, it refused to consider the administrative and social reforms 
which were needed to ensure it could compete effectively in the European 
political system and like Poland, its antiquated institutions and government life 
left it increasingly vulnerable but this was a lesson the Sultan and his generals had 
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yet to learn. 
 The first section analyzes how Poland’s political weakness opened the 
country up for foreign influence within the starting with the process of the Polish 
royal election in 1764 right up until the Russo-Turkish War of 1768. Then the 
impact of the Prusso-Russian alliance on the Polish royal election will be 
discussed. This will be followed by an examination of responses within Poland, 
i.e. the reform movements there and their impact on neighboring countries will be 
studied. This leads on to discussion of the increased foreign intervention into 
Poland, further internal reactions within the country and the full 
internationalization of the Polish problem, through the formation of an armed 
Confederation, and the simultaneous effects that events in Poland had on Russia’s 
relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
 In the second and final phase of events leading up to the Partition, the 
impact of the Russian expansion into the Ottoman Empire and the reverberation of 
the Russian victories upon the balance of power in Eastern Europe in general will 
be studied. It will be argued that these developments cleared the way for 
bargaining among the three partitioning powers about the upset of the balance in 
the region and ways to restore it through a partition of Poland. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
EASTERN EUROPE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 
 
“It is extremely worthy of remark, that one of the partitioning powers, 
Prussia, was formerly in a state of vassalage to the Republic; Russia 
once saw its capital and throne possessed by the Poles; and Austria, 
scarcely a century ago, was indebted to a sovereign of this country for 
the preservation of its metropolis, and almost for its very existence”. 
 
William Coxe5 
 
 
2.1 The Balance of Power in Eastern Europe until 1764 
 
The last two decades of the 17th century witnessed one of the biggest coalitions 
formed till then against a state, the Ottoman Empire, in Europe. This coalition, 
made up of Poland, Austria, Russia and Venice, under the banner of the Papacy, 
was known as the Holy Alliance. Thanks to the military brilliance of the Polish
                                                 
5 William Coxe, Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden and Denmark: Interspersed with Historical 
Relations and Political Inquiries, (Dublin: T. Cadell, 1784), 55-56. 
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King Jan III Sobieski, the Ottoman Armies were stopped at the gates of Vienna. 
The Turks, after a series of severe defeats lost territories and power on their 
northern frontier in Hungary, which was culminated in the humiliating Treaty of
Karlowitz in 1699, and in the Treaty of İstanbul in 1700.6 The defeat of the Turks, 
who lost portions of their Balkan possessions to Austria, Poland and Venice and 
the port of Azov, a direct access to the Black Sea, to Russia, was to shatter the 
balance of power in Eastern Europe, simply because there was not a strong 
enough power to counterbalance both Austria and Russia at the same time.7 
Arguably Poland paid the price for its victory against the Turks with its own 
political death  less than a century later.8 Jan III Sobieski’s decision to concentrate 
all his resources on the Turkish threat, at the cost of the Republic's other foreign 
concerns, left the Russians in possession of much of Ukraine; exhausted his troops 
to rescuing Vienna and abandoned the original idea of checking the Prussian rise 
to power. Thus the costs far outweighed the gains. The Habsburgs retained their 
super-power status; the Prussians gained international recognition for their 
independent kingdom; and the Muscovites started to build a Russian Empire, all 
of which were destined to dominate Eastern Europe in the following century, 
ironically, directly at the expense of the Polish realm.9 
 
 
                                                 
6 Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 1679-1793, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1990), 9-15.  
7 Micheal Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence 1683-1797, (London: Longman, 2003), 153 
– 157. 
8 Oscar Halecki, A History of Poland, (New York: Roy Publishers, 1976), 171-174. 
9 Davies, Heart of Europe, 266-267. 
10 
 
2.1.1 The Great Northern Wars 1700 – 1721 
 
The sequence of events in eighteenth century Eastern Europe did not start only 
with the decadence of the Turks. The power struggle between Sweden and Russia 
in the Baltic region, had turned into an Eastern European regional war as 
neighboring countries were drawn in. The Great Northern Wars, which started 
with the combined Russo-Polish attack on Sweden in 1700, lasted for 21 years 
and produced  important consequences for the region.10 The initial years of the 
wars witnessed the success of the Swedish armies. The Swedish King, Charles XII 
successfully occupied the Polish Duchy of Courland. Poland was continuously 
unsuccessful against Sweden, losing its grip on Wilno, Warsaw and Cracow. The 
Swedish invasion was the start of the troubles of the Polish King Augustus II. 
Rival armed confederations were formed by the Polish nobility, Szlachta, adding 
civil war to foreign occupation. One Confederation relied heavily on Russian 
money and men; the other, backed by Sweden, produced its own contender for the 
Polish throne: Stanisław Leszczyński. In 1706 Charles XII marched into Saxony, 
forcing Augustus to renounce the Polish throne in favor of Leszczyński. 
Guaranteeing Leszczyński a safe rule, Charles XII set out to Russia to finish the 
campaign that had lasted for more than seven years. Instead of advancing to the 
well-fortified city of Moscow which would offer resistance, Charles XII decided 
to head south, hoping that he might get help from the Hetman of the Ukraine, Ivan 
Mazeppa and the Ottoman Sultan, Ahmed III.11 Yet, the siege of the fortress of the 
Poltava proved disastrous for the Swedes who were outnumbered by a Russian 
                                                 
10 Black, The Rise of the European Powers,21-28. 
11 Orest Subtelny, “Mazepists and Stanisławists: The First Ukranian Emigres.” In Poland and 
Ukraine: Past and Present”, edited by Peter Potichnyj, (Toronto: Webcom, 1980), 83-85. 
11 
 
army by two to one. The decisive Russian victory at the Battle of Poltava in 1709 
substantially changed the balance of power  in the Baltic.12 
 After this defeat, the Swedish King Charles XII sought refuge in the 
Ottoman Empire, something which caused a Russo-Ottoman War in 1710-171113, 
in which the Ottomans were victorious.14 The peace treaty concluded after the war 
had a special impact on Ottoman – Polish – Russian relations. Russia would return 
all the lands it had conquered from the Ottomans, including the Azov Fortress, 
and would refrain from interfering in Poland’s internal affairs.15 
 The Turkish victory demonstrated that the Ottoman Empire was still an 
important state in the Eastern European system of the balance of power. 
Nevertheless, the Russo – Ottoman peace treaty did not bring the Great Northern 
War to an end. The Russians quickly occupied Estonia and Livonia, consolidating 
their foothold on the Baltic shore.16 After these Baltic gains, Russian troops drove 
Leszczyński out of Poland. Peter the Great, backed by 18000 Russian, troops 
began mediation between his client-king Augustus and the Szlachta. Peter 
undertook to guarantee the peace settlement between the parties, having the right 
to interfere in Polish affairs and to prevent any alteration to the Polish constitution 
without Russian consent. The Dumb (or Silent) Sejm at its meeting in January 
1717, in which it was surrounded by Russian soldiers, meekly accepted these 
                                                 
12 Matthew Smith Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century 1713-1783 (New York: Longman, 
1987), 259-260. 
13 For detailed account of the war, see Nimet Akdes Kurat, Prut Seferi ve Barışı, (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu, (1953). 
14 Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged, (Harlow, Pearson Longman: 
2007), 90-95. 
15 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi Vol. 4/1, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), 84. 
16 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the 
Present, (London: Pimlico, 2002), 262. 
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proposals.17 Augustus was restored to his throne as a Russian client-king in return 
for a formal Polish acknowledgement of Russian rights to Kiev and Poland's 
eastern lands.18 With the Warsaw Treaty of 1717, which was ratified by the Polish 
Parliament, Russia guaranteed Polish independence. With this agreement, the 
Polish army was limited  to  a maximum of only 12,000 soldiers. Russia gained 
the right to maintain some garrisons in Poland. In theory, this was just friendly 
cooperation. In practice, it meant the transformation of Poland into a Russian 
vassal state.19 
 Hostilities continued in the Baltic until Charles was killed while 
campaigning against Denmark in 1718. In 1721, a peace treaty was concluded 
between Russia and Sweden, confirming Russian gains on the Baltic. At the end 
of the Great Northern Wars in 1721, Sweden was severely defeated and lost its 
place in the system for good. Poland counted for so little that it was not even 
asked to participate in the peace talks.20 Swedish influence upon Poland gradually 
diminished while that of Russia rose in proportion to the Swedish decline.21 
Russia filled the power vacuum caused by the decline of Sweden and thus became 
an important actor in Eastern Europe. 
 With the Treaty of Nystad, Peter the Great solved one of the three 
fundamental problems of Russian foreign relations: the Swedish. For a solution of 
                                                 
17 Mariusz Markiewicz, “The Functioning of the Monarchy during the Reigns of the Electors of 
Saxony, 1697-1763”, in The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, 1500-1795, edited 
by Richard Butterwick, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 179-181. 
18 John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World 1700 – 1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion 
and Containment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 29. 
19 Stanisław, Arnold and Marian Zychowski, Outline History of Poland: From the Beginning of the 
State to the Present Time, (Warsaw: Polonia Publishing House, 1965), 63; Jerzy Lukowski, 
Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697–1795, 
(New York: Routledge, 1991), 7. 
20 Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland, (New York: Cambridge 
UniversityPress, 2007), 107. 
21 LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 227-230. 
13 
 
the Polish problem, Russia had to wait for Catherine the Great.22  
 
2.1.2 The War of the Polish Succession 1733-1738 
 
Russian supremacy over Poland lasted until the death of the Polish King Augustus 
II. In the contest to find a successor, Stanisław  Leszczyński, whose daughter was 
married to Louis XV, enjoyed the support of France and strong magnates like 
Czartoryski and Potocki. Leszczyński wanted to be the king of Poland after 
Augustus’ death, something which might challenge the Russian control over the 
country.23 The other main contender for the thone was Frederick August of 
Saxony, the son of August II and the son-in-law of Austrian Emperor Joseph I. 
The  result was that the Polish election held after the death of Augustus sparked 
the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738), as it was called, between Poland, 
Prussia, France, and Spain against Saxony, Austria, and Russia resulting in a 
series of battles across the continent. Ironically, the War of Polish Succession was 
mostly fought outside Poland and mostly over non-Polish issues.24  
 As far as Poland’s internal politics were concerned the War of the Polish 
Succession marked a change in the attitude of the Polish state towards the 
dissidents, i.e. its non-Catholic population. The dissidents’ right to hold public 
offices was revoked, something which would become a hot topic after the election 
                                                 
22 Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 264. 
23 Lukowski, Liberty’s Folly, 157-158. 
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of Poniatowski in 1764, sparking the events leading to the first partition.25 At the 
end of the war, France, which wanted to counter-balance Austrian influence in 
Eastern Europe, was defeated and so Augustus III, the Austrian-Russian 
candidate, for the Polish throne, was elected king of Poland.26 The Poles, once 
again, were not consulted about the terms27 and Russian supremacy over Poland 
was once again confirmed. 
 
2.1.3 The Russo-Turkish and Austro-Turkish Wars 
 
The close cooperation of Austria and Russia during the War of the Polish 
Succession led to the signing of a secret agreement between the two countries, 
binding Austria to join Russia in a possible future war against the Ottomans. The 
year 1735 brought temporary tranquility to the War of Polish Succession in 
Poland, if not in other fronts of the war. Russia, knowing about the Ottoman 
entanglement with Persian affairs, did not miss its chance and declared war on the 
Porte in May 1736, with the primary purpose of ending the troublesome Tartar 
raids into Russian territory.28 The Russians army was fully mobilised, whereas the 
Ottoman army was not ready for war at all.29 The Russians, this time, instead of 
focusing on the Balkans, decided to attack in the Crimea. This surprise attack was 
successful and the Russian army quickly advanced and captured Azak and Özü 
                                                 
25 The course of events will be evaluated in the following chapter. 
26 Daniel Stone, The Polish-Lithuanian State, 1386-1795, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
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29 Virginia H. Aksan, “Ottoman War and Warfare 1453-1812.” In War and Warfare in the Early 
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but could not hold onto the Crimea due to the difficulties of maintaining well-
supplied garrisons in the region30 and had to withdraw after an occupation of less 
than six months.31  Austria, which joined Russia in 1737 in its war against the 
Porte, too was initially very successful in the war in the Balkans. Nevertheless, by 
the end, it was unable to continue with the war due to the neglects in the army and 
concluded a separate peace treaty with the Ottomans, evacuating Little  Wallachia, 
and northern Bosnia and Serbia.32 
 Starting with the Treaty of Belgrade, the Ottoman Empire was not 
involved in any major European war and indeed there was a long period of peace  
until hostilities broke out with Russia in 1768. During this time, instead of 
focusing on domestic reforms as its rivals did, the Ottoman government sank back 
into lethargy, confident that its recent military successes had restored the Empire’s 
fortunes and that nothing further needed to be done in the way of reform or 
modernization. This long peace period proved counter-productive for the 
Ottomans.33 
 
2.1.4 The War of the Austrian Succession and the Diplomatic Revolution 
 
The end of the Russo-Turkish War did not mean that Eastern Europe would now 
enter a period of peace. On the contrary, a new European war, the War of the 
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Austrian Succession (1740–48), began. Prussia, which had seized most of Silesia 
into its dominions after the war, was turning out to be a major power of Eastern 
Europe.34 Austria was losing a commercially important territory to its neighbor 
and so looked for ways to get it back and reviewed its foreign policy preferences 
in general and the Eastern European balance of power system in particular. It now 
considered Prussia rather than France as its prime enemy 35 a change which was 
later labelled the “Diplomatic Revolution”.36 
 The Diplomatic Revolution referred to these unexpected alliances between 
traditional enemies. The term ‘Revolution’ refers to the extent of the astonishment 
that Austria and France created simply by forming an alliance. It was a total 
departure from the established pattern of the European international relations. It 
was partly brought about by Franco – British colonial rivalry, plus, the discontent 
of Austria and Russia at the rising power of Prussia in the East. The engineer of 
this “arithmetical method” of the alliance was Wenzel Anton, Prince of Kaunitz-
Rietberg, the Austrian Chancellor between 1753 and 1793.37 From 1748 Kaunitz 
regarded Frederick II as the greatest, most dangerous and most implacable enemy 
of Austria and thus, believed that Prussia, not France, should be the main target of 
Austrian foreign policy with the prime aim of recovering Silesia.38 Francis I, too, 
considered Prussia as the main threat to his empire and so rested heavily upon the 
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French alliance and French influence on the Ottoman Porte against Prussia. He 
saw Russia as one of the most formidable powers in Europe and thus, it was 
important for Austria not to antagonize the Russians. According to Francis the 
Turks,  together with their religion, courage and attitudes, were a very dangerous 
neighbour and a  powerful enemy and thus, a Turkish war should be avoided. His 
desire to conclude a strong Austro–Russian alliance, also drove him against the 
Turks. Because of their common enemies, the Turks, Francis treated Russia as a 
natural ally.39 
 The most important features of the Diplomatic Revolution were that it 
brought ancient enmities to an end to and destroyed the ‘Old System’, i.e. the anti-
French Grand Alliance of Britain and Austria. In addition, it marked the beginning 
of a shift of political emphasis from the countries of Western Europe to those of 
the east, due to the declining involvement of Britain and France in continental 
European affairs, resulting from their concentration on developments overseas. 
The leading problems of Europe then became the fate of Poland, the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire, the aggressive expansion of Russia and the growing enmity 
between Prussia and Austria.40 
 
2.1.5 The Seven Years’ Wars 
 
Austria was the prime beneficiary from the new alliance since it meant that there 
were no French threats in Italy and Germany anymore. Furthermore, the long-
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standing French alliance with the Ottomans was no longer directed against 
Austria.41 The signing of a convention between Britain and Prussia not only 
encouraged France to make an alliance with Austria, but at the same time angered 
Russia, driving it to draw up plans to attack Prussia, though these were pre-
empted by the Prussian invasion of Saxony in August 1756.42 
With the help of the “Diplomatic Revolution”, a new coalition was formed 
against Prussia to check its rise in the region and Europe found itself once again 
strangled by another war. The Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) brought nothing but 
disaster to the belligerent parties and thus, forcing states to reconsider their 
decisions before taking up arms against each other in case of any dispute among 
them. The Seven Years War exhausted Prussia, Austria and Russia. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that during the following two decades, their attention was 
focused on domestic reform and the reorganization of the state. The objective of 
these reforms was to strengthen the state, particularly in the economic and military 
sphere in order to support the large armies required to maintain Great Power 
status, which depended on military power and the ability to use it. Nevertheless, 
Eastern European monarchies, instead of war, found it was best for their interests 
to settle their disputes through diplomacy and territorial adjustments.43 Poland 
was the first victim of this so-called “peaceful expansion”44 idea. The major states 
of Europe were to equalize their powers through the partitions of Poland. The 
Ottoman intervention in the Polish problem after the formation of the Bar 
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Confederation in 1768 directly changed the nature of the problem and the Eastern 
European balance of power. Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman 
Empire was to be compensated by Austria and Prussia, in Poland through a 
partition.45 
 
2.2 Dynamics of the 18th Century 
 
2.2.1 Raison d'état 
 
The eighteenth century saw a shift in the motivation behind the foreign policies of 
European powers. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries religious and 
dynastic matters had been the most important priorities. In the eighteenth century, 
however, religion played no serious part in determining international policies 
among the major powers. Religious sentiment certainly existed. But religious 
differences did not prevent countries from the formation of alliances.46 Yet, it was 
still sometimes used for propaganda purposes, as in Poland to justify aggression 
by Russia and Prussia in alleged support of the 'Dissidents' in the events leading 
up to the First Partition. 
 By the mid eighteenth century, international relations were conducted on 
the basis of the doctrine of raison d'état. This was the argument that the needs of 
the state dictated the political actions of its rulers. To do whatever was necessary 
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to further one’s self-interest became the right course of action for a ruler. The 
general acceptance of this idea resulted in a competitive state system in Europe.47 
In an age which ranked states by the extent of their territory and population, the 
struggle for mastery on the Continent meant an increasing emphasis on the build-
up of military power. The possession of a large standing army was the best 
diplomatic tool of the time. “Negotiations without arms produce as little 
impression as a musical score without instruments”48 according to Frederick II 
and might was equated with right. 
 Thus, the idea of expansion became the whole basis of international 
relations in the eighteenth century. States with only small territories would be poor 
states, making them weak and perhaps unlikely to survive. The ultimate extension 
of this reasoning was that weak states, such as territorially big but 
administratively and militarily midget Poland, did not deserve to survive at all.49 
 
2.2.2 The Balance of Power 
 
One restraining element that prevented violence becoming the only means of 
international communication in the eighteenth century was the concept of the 
balance of power.50 Though it had been practiced in the late fifteenth century 
among the Italian city states, after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, it came to have 
much wider application to the whole of Europe. With the Treaty of Utrecht, the 
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European powers declared their intention to confirm the peace and tranquility of 
the Christian world through a just equilibrium of power.  Preserving the balance 
meant that no single state or alliance of states could be allowed to become too 
powerful and thus a danger to the peace of Europe. If it did, then the other states 
would combine together to reduce its power.51 
 Yet, things did not work out as easily as this might sound. After all, in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century, there had been two main states, that is to say 
France and Habsburg Austria, to be counter-balanced. Minor states had supported 
one side or another in a changing pattern of alliances. After 1713, no one state had 
dominance over Europe and the arrival of new players, Russia and Prussia, in the 
power game began to disturb traditional policies. In 1756 the established order 
was totally shattered by the "Diplomatic Revolution".52 
 By the mid-eighteenth century there were five major powers, France, 
Austria, Britain, Russia and Prussia, which were generally regarded as being of 
near equality in power. Any gains by one of these states alarmed the others and so 
invoked the balance of power mechanism to justify territorial aggrandizement of 
the kind practiced in Eastern Europe in the partitions of Poland. After all, the 
balance of power was not a principle of order. Nor was it a legal guarantee. It 
required that the aggressive powerful states should be contained while rarely 
offering help for weak ones, and so most of the time it worked to the advantage of 
the strong53 through so-called “partition diplomacy”. 
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 Partition diplomacy meant that where one state could not be prevented 
from acquiring territory at the expense of a weaker neighbor, other adjoining 
states were entitled to make similar gains for themselves in order to maintain the 
existing balance of power. The cheapest way to achieve this was not to fight a 
costly war against an equal in order to obtain a share of the spoils, but by prior 
agreement, to jointly dismember the unresisting body of a victim state54 - Poland 
would be the best example for the partition diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE MAKING OF THE POLISH PROBLEM 
 
 
 
“Magnanimous Polish Gentlemen! You are a glorious republic, and 
have Nie Pozwalam [I do not allow] and strange methods of business 
and of behavior to your Kings and others. If your glorious Republic 
continues to be managed in such manner, not good will come of it, but 
evil. The day will arrive and is perhaps not far off, when it will get 
torn to shreds hither thither; be stuffed in the pockets of covetous 
neighbors, Brandenburg, Muscovy and Austria, and find itself reduced 
to zero, and abolished from the face of the world”. 
 
Jan II Kazimierz55 
 
 
3.1 Poland in the Eighteenth Century 
 
Apart from the dynamics of the eighteenth century international system, Poland’s 
internal weaknesses also played an important role in the first partition. However,
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Polish weaknesses did not just show up at the start of the century. On the contrary,
they were engrained in Polish political traditions. One of the elements constituting 
Poland’s soft belly was the weakness of the central government. The weakness of 
the central government rendered the country open to foreign intervention into 
Poland’s internal affairs. However, one should not forget the role of the 
partitioning powers’ constant promotion of Polish weaknesses in order to keep 
Poland in a weak state. Even though, many members of the Szlachta, Polish 
nobility, believed that it was precisely because of its political chaos, that Poland 
was still alive,56 Poland needed to get rid of this chaotic system. Yet, attempts to 
reform the country were always hampered by surrounding powers.57 Any attempts 
at reforms which aimed at getting rid of the shortcomings of the Polish political 
system would be perceived as threats by neighboring powers and thus lead to the 
destruction of Poland. Ironically, Poland might have survived for a  longer period  
without any reform—though of course it would not have been a strong and viable 
entity.58  
 
3.2 Szlachta 
 
One of the main reasons why the central government of Poland was weak was the 
fact that the Szlachta, the most populous class of nobility anywhere in eighteenth 
                                                 
56 Zamoyski, The Polish Way, 217-221; Davies, Heart of Europe, 261. 
57 Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982), 513. 
58 Jerzy Lukowski, The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795, (New York: Routledge, 1999), 12; 
Davies, Europe: A History, 664. 
25 
 
century Europe59, was uniquely strong vis-a-vis the kings of Poland. The Polish 
belonging to the Szlachta considered themselves as a unique race, an attitude 
which one might almost call a ‘racism’ of the nobility, claiming to have the most 
blue blood in all Europe.60 Even though they had incredible inequality of wealth 
among each other, equal treatment of the members of the Szlachta, including 
women, might be considered as its distinctive feature comparing to other 
nobilities elsewhere in Europe. Polish women belonging to the Szlachta for 
instance, were able to own property.61 
 To a great extent the Szlachta, enjoyed freedom vis-a-vis the central 
government and ultimately it became the class ruling the country. In 1374, the 
Szlachta had been exempted from taxation. In 1505, the state lost the ability to 
legislate without first asking for the Szlachta’s consent, which was knows as Nihil 
Novi. It was an unparalleled development in Continental Europe at that time and 
the Szlachta was not willing to share its influence in the country with any other 
groups of the society.62  
 The Polish nobility, of course, was not just a single entity. Each big family 
of the Szlachta had their own agendas, political preferences and aims and disputes 
with other members of the Szlachta.63 These differences among the members of 
the Szlachta would to be used and abused by the neighboring powers of Poland in 
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the eighteenth century eastern balance system.64 Yet, at the same time, this love 
affair was not a platonic one. The Szlachta, too, would use and try to influence the 
balance in the region through the power vacuums in the system of balance of 
power and in accordance with their interests, they would ally themselves with 
Austria, Russia, the Ottoman Empire or other powers and thus act as an important 
player in Eastern European international system.65 The recurrent problems which 
arose in the Polish political system, e.g. during the election of Poniatowski, or 
when the confederations were set up after the Dissidents’ problem erupted in the 
government, or indeed in the organization of the movements against reform were 
not just caused by members of the Szlachta, but more importantly by the outside 
states interfering in it.66 
 
3.3 Elective Monarchy and Pacta Conventa 
 
The Most Serene Commonwealth of the Two Nations, Serenissima Respublica 
Poloniae, was formed in 1569, with the Union of Lublin. Yet, despite the title, this 
Commonwealth was in fact a monarchy disguised as a republic or perhaps vice 
versa. The Szlachta were electing their leader through "democratic process" 
constituting the part of the republic, whereas, the elected leader was invested with 
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the title of a king – though with little of the power of one.67 
 After the death of Zygmunt II, the last king from the Jagiellonian dynasty 
in 1572, an interregnum of two years followed. The Szlachta increased its political 
power at expense of the central government. The nobles took the opportunity of 
the election of a king to conclude a new contract with him, further restraining his 
powers.68 One of their innovations was the establishment of a permanent advisory 
board or council to the king, which limited his powers.69  These arrangements 
were called the pacta conventa. After the death of Zygmunt the necessary 
requirement for a new king to be member of the ruling dynasty was abolished. 
With the election of Henry of Anjou, the brother of then reigning king of France, 
Charles IX, the pacta conventa was put into effect. Even though the St. 
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre had taken place less than a year prior to the election 
of Henry, tolerance was granted to all religious bodies in the society.70 The 
sovereign was obliged to be a Catholic and Catholicism was designated as the 
state religion.  
 More importantly the king would have no voice in the election of his 
successor. The throne was made entirely elective and thus, opening the way for 
even foreigners to be the king of Poland.71 This turned the Polish elections into a 
struggle between foreign powers to have more influence in Poland. After 1573, 
the opportunities for foreign interference in an election were quite common. Many 
European countries were involved directly or indirectly in Polish elections and 
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different combination of Russian, Prussian, Austrian, French, Swedish and 
Ottoman resources were used to influence the outcome. The election of the 
Ottoman-sponsored Stefan Batory in 1575 and the two Wars of Polish Succession 
(1587-1588 and 1733-1738) are the most specific instances of this foreign 
intervention and Poniatowski’s election in 1764, too, would foster a similar kind 
of foreign intervention in Polish affairs.72  
 
3.4 Liberum Veto 
 
Poland’s laws aimed at protecting the independence of each individual but 
paradoxically the results of them were the oppression of all.73 The ruling elite 
enjoyed extensive rights over legislative matters that were unparalleled in Europe 
at that time. The principle of unanimity of legislation of the Szlachta was an 
important element of Polish political life. The liberum veto was one of the most 
important of them. Put roughly the liberum veto meant unlimited power of any 
member of the Szlachta to stop any kind of legislation by simply uttering the 
words “nie pozwalam”, (I do not allow it.) Behind the principle of the liberum 
veto was the conviction that all law must have the consent of all those who would 
enforce it.74 This was enough to paralyze the whole Polish parliament. Simply 
because of the liberum veto, a mere three laws were passed by the Diet during the 
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reign of Augustus III, during the 30 years of his rule.75 
 The liberum veto, an incredibly strong anti-legislation tool, was granted to 
all members of the nobility in the Polish parliament, the Sejm. Anyone somehow 
possessing noble blood, but not necessarily a noble lifestyle, was able to use it.76 
This gave ill-intentioned foreign powers the opportunity to exploit it. It was easy 
to find a backward and impoverished deputy to induce by a large bribe to utter 
veto in order to prevent the unwanted measures. The entire governmental system 
of administration was crippled by this obstacle. The weakness of the whole Polish 
parliamentary system was carefully fostered by the Republic's neighbors. Russia 
of course was one of them, applying it most frequently by easily buying off the 
not-so-well-off members of the Szlachta.77 Once entangled with the Polish 
domestic affairs, it was Russia’s primary aim to preserve the so called golden 
liberty of the Szlachta, i.e. the liberum veto.78 
 
3.5 The Right to Resistance – The Confederations 
 
Along with the liberum veto, the right to form confederations was another element 
that paved the way for anarchy in Poland. The Szlachta had a legal 'right of 
resistance' to fight against an unjust ruler. The practice of Confederation – i.e. the 
formation of an armed league to correct a breach of the constitution- was an 
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established part of the political life, later providing grounds for resistance to the 
imposed rule of foreign regimes.79 Just like the liberum veto, this, too, was abused 
by foreign powers. Russia, for instance, had no difficulty in finding a group of the 
szlachta ready to gather to fight for Russian interests.80 The armed confederations 
not only fought against the government but also against each other. Some 
confederations, having lost in their struggle sometimes fled to other countries and 
thus potentially internationalized the nature of the cause that they were fighting 
for.81 The events preceding the First Partition of Poland, for instance, included a 
further party to the ongoing clashes within the country – the Ottoman Empire, 
whose involvement sparked a war between it and Russia, the consequences of 
which would be devastating both for the Porte and the Rzeczpospolita.  
 
3.6 The Dissidents 
 
Even though the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth before 1700 could generally 
be considered a religiously tolerant state82 this was no longer true by the start of 
the 18th century.83 Poland had been converted to Christianity at the end of the 10th 
century, whereas Lithuania had remained pagan until the end of the 14th century. 
The marriage between the Jagiellon and Anjou dynasties imposed Christianity on 
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Lithuania, yet, the Lithuanians chose to adopt Orthodoxy. The 16th century 
reformation was followed by the introduction of Lutheranism into the German-
speaking cities of west and north of Poland. Poland also happened to possess the 
largest Jewish population in Europe.84 
 Yet, by the middle of the 17th century, Catholic Church had fully re-
established itself in Poland. A Polish identity was increasingly defined by 
Catholicism. As a result of the success of the Counter Reformation in Poland, the 
country was fiercely Catholic and the state oppressed the relatively small number 
of non-Catholics, i.e the Orthodox in the east and the Lutherans in the north. The 
minorities were restricted and their civil and political rights were reduced. As a 
result of this harsh policy, some Orthodox Christians broke away from their 
church and accepted the Pope as their spiritual leader, while retaining their own 
Slavonic liturgy.85 Yet, these Uniates, intermediate between Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy, were welcomed neither by the Catholic Church nor by society, being 
labelled as second-class Christians.86 The Dissidents were also socially and 
politically disadvantaged and suffered some religious harassment, which led the 
dissidents living in Poland to ally themselves with neighboring powers.87  Thus, 
the Uniates, the Orthodox and the Protestants living in the Commonwealth 
presented an easy pretext for foreign powers to intervene on the grounds of the 
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restoration of their social and political rights.88 Orthodox Ukrainians preferred 
Russian rule89 and thus strongly opposed the Catholization and Polonization of the 
Republic.90 Encouraged by Orthodox clergy inside Poland, Russia would 
intervene in Polish internal affairs on behalf of Orthodox believers several times.91
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE ROAD TO THE FIRST PARTITION 
 
 
 
“One Pole – A Charmer, two Poles – a brawl; 
Three Poles – ah, that’s the Polish Question!” 
 
Voltaire92 
 
 
4.1 The Royal Election of 1764 and Its Aftermath 
 
 The death of Augustus III was the trigger for the events that lead up the partition 
of Poland. The Polish Royal Elections turned into a show of strength between the 
major powers of Eastern Europe, i.e. Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Fortunately the 
tension did not immediately escalate into a European war. Yet, the process of these 
Polish royal elections marked the first tilting in the Eastern European balance of 
power.
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4.1.1 The Russo – Prussian Agreement on the Polish Election 
 
Augustus III was the second Polish king to come from the House of Wettin of 
Saxony. His origins alone might have been enough to unite the enemies of Poland.  
Russia, on one hand, found it in her best interests to keep the "free" royal elections 
going in order to have a say in Polish internal affairs but consecutively Saxon 
kings all elected from the same family might potentially turn the Polish throne 
into a hereditary one for the Wettins, as Count Nikita Panin, Catherine’s principal 
adviser in foreign affairs, was honest enough to admit.93 Russia needed a weak 
and a divided Poland, of the kind which could be achieved through the election of 
a king who owed his throne to Russia and so was dependent on Catherine.94 In 
addition, on her recent accession to Russian throne, Catherine required a foreign 
policy success to consolidate her power at home and abroad and she believed that 
if she managed to place a pro-Russian candidate on the Polish throne, she would 
accomplish this by placating possible critics inside Russia.95  
 Prussia, on the other hand, did not want to see another Saxon King on the 
Polish throne, as the Saxons were serious regional rivals for Prussia and 
termination of the Saxon – Polish link would benefit Prussia by reducing Saxon 
power in the region.96 Frederick fully realized the importance of Russia as an ally. 
For him, Russia was a power that would make all Europe tremble in half a 
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century.97 In the Seven Years’ War, it was the Russian armies that had caused 
Prussia to suffer serious defeats, especially at Zorndorf and Kunersdorf, and 
again, it was thanks to   developments in Russia that the “Miracle of the House of 
Brandenburg” happened. Frederick knew very well that the friendship of Russia 
was the salvation of Prussia. He dreaded Russia most among other countries and 
he understood that he could not afford to be in collision with his country’s big 
eastern neighbor again and so decided to join Russia on the Polish election.98 
 These concerns drew Russia and Prussia together and an unexpected 
"divine favor"99, as Catherine called it, occurred when the Saxon candidate, 
Frederick Christian died of smallpox at the end of 1763. His 13 year-old son was 
not eligible to rule and this left only Prince Xavier, the oldest brother of Frederick 
Christian as a possible candidate for the Polish throne.100 
 Frederick II, by playing on Russia's worries about the intentions of its 
southern neighbor, the Ottoman Empire, managed to guarantee the Russian 
alliance on the Polish election. Rexin, the Prussian ambassador at Constantinople, 
proposed an alliance101 to the Ottoman Sultan, Mustafa III, against Russia, which 
he deliberately intended to be discovered by Prince Nikolay Repnin.102 He, at the 
same time attempted to provoke the Porte into a war against Russia, by claiming 
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that the latter was conspiring to invade Poland.103 Frederick’s approaches to the 
Turks were intended to arouse anxiety in Russia and his intentions were fulfilled. 
Frederick persuaded Catherine, who was already afraid of a united Austrian-
French-Turkish front against Russia,104 to conclude a formal alliance in 1764, 
based on the earlier treaty between Frederick II and Peter III in 1762. The new 
treaty was to last for eight years, binding Frederick II to support the election of 
Stanisław August Poniatowski, whom Catherine proposed for the Polish throne, 
thereby enabling both Russia and Prussia also to protect the Dissidents, i.e. 
adherents of the Orthodox and Protestant confessions in Poland.105 
 Along with their common cause, one of the reasons why Russia came to an 
understanding with Prussia was due to Panin’s design for a so-called “Northern 
System”, which was a set of alliances of the northern states of Europe, i.e. Russia, 
Prussia, Britain, Sweden and Poland, against the Bourbon – Habsburg league’s 
Catholic alliance and to some extent also the Ottoman Empire.106 It aimed to 
protect western frontiers of Russia, to provide security against Sweden through 
concluding an alliance with it and to maintain the Russian control over Poland. 
Yet, Britain was reluctant to commit itself to this system.107 Furthermore, Russian 
insistence on the “Turkish Clause” of the treaty that was meant to be signed with 
Britain further alienated the latter from concluding an alliance with the former.108 
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British reluctance to undertake to aid Russia in the event of a Turkish attack, 
pushed Russia and Prussia even closer, especially over events relating to Poland. 
To Britain matters relating to Poland alone were a very remote consideration.109 
 News of the negotiations between Prussia and Russia and rumors about the 
intentions of Frederick and Catherine towards Poland in terms of a possible 
partition began to spread rapidly. Frederick’s designs on Western Prussia were 
already known. In a treatise he wrote when he was twenty one, Frederick argued 
that the acquisition of this territory was necessary to link up the scattered lands of 
Prussia.110 His fanciful early thoughts on the eastward expansion of Prussia were 
not forgotten in his maturity. Even though Frederick already hinted at such plans 
in 1752 in his testament, depicting Poland as an artichoke, which was “ready to be 
consumed leaf by leaf”, sometimes a city, sometimes a district, until all is eaten 
up111, he was quick to deny such accusations in 1764. He assured the Austrian 
Ambassador that there was no plan for the partition of Poland by Russia and 
Prussia.112 Catherine, too, disclaimed any such idea, stating that she never had any 
such intention, nor felt the need to extend the limits of the Russian Empire.113  
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4.1.2 The Southern Stance 
 
Unlike Russia and Prussia, Austria, France and the Ottoman Empire did not have 
a consensus on a common candidate for the Polish throne and therefore, they 
failed to present strong opposition to the Russo-Prussian candidate Poniatowski. 
The inability of the “Southern States” to unite was to have dire consequences for 
the upcoming elections for the Polish throne – the least troublesome election in 
the Republic’s history, according to the soon-to-be-elected king, Poniatowski.114 
 The reasons why Prussia did not want a Saxon king on the Polish throne 
were exactly the reasons why Austria wished to see one. A Saxon king on the 
Polish throne was in Austria’s interest, as Saxony was pro-Austria and Catholic 
and thus, would be a means to counterbalance Prussian influence in the region. 
For this reason, Austria at first declared its support for Prince Xavier. However, 
news of the arrival of Russian troops in Poland alarmed Austria, forcing Wenzel 
Anton von Kaunitz, the Austrian Foreign Minister, to reconsider his country’s 
preferences. 115  
 France had always regarded Poland as one of the pivots of French policy 
in Eastern Europe against the Habsburgs and Russia.116 Even though France had 
played an active role in the previous elections of Poland, this time, it was not its 
priority. France did not want to risk a war against Prussia and Russia; instead, it 
tried to influence its ally, the Ottoman Empire to intervene in the elections and 
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thus, was half-hearted in its support for the Saxon candidate.117 Furthermore, the 
French King Louis XV’s system of Secret du Roi was another important factor, 
causing French influence over Poland to diminish. Apart from the regularly 
accredited representatives of France in European courts, the King himself had his 
own diplomatic system, consisting of secret agents, which directly corresponded 
with the king. The King’s instructions to official representatives were most of the 
time in conflict with the ones sent to his Secret du Roi agents and thus, two 
opposing views tended to neutralize each other, with neither having any real 
impact on European courts.118 The Polish election is an excellent example of this 
debatable policy, as the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs used to ask “what do 
we care for that republic?” while the King’s “secret diplomats” were trying to find 
a way to have an impact on the outcome of the election.119 
 The Porte declared that it would not tolerate any foreigner taking the 
Polish throne, as the king must be a native-born Pole.120 Still, the Ottomans did 
not want to meddle with Polish internal affairs. Ahmed Resmi Efendi, when 
heading to Prussia after being appointed as the Ottoman envoy in Berlin, was 
instructed to go directly to Berlin without losing time in Poland on the occasion of 
the death of Augustus III,121 which might be considered an indication of the 
Ottoman reluctance to take an active part in the upcoming Polish elections. 
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 A mere Ottoman declaration for a Piast candidate was not enough for 
Austria to risk a war against Russia over a candidate not favored by Russia. 
Austria showed no signs of going beyond diplomatic support.122 Since no money, 
troops or diplomatic support could be expected from any foreign power, Prince 
Xavier realized that he could not compete for the throne.123 So he withdrew from 
the elections and thus leaving Poniatowski as the only candidate for the Polish 
throne. 
 
4.2 A Failed Rival and the Results of the Elections 
 
As the date of the Dietine convocations approached, the anti-Russian Polish 
Hetman Branicki looked around for possible foreign help to decrease the Russian 
impact on the elections. He sent a letter to the Porte, complaining about the 
number of Russian troops in Poland and asking to counterbalance Russia’s 
activities. Hearing the news of the Hetman’s letter, the pro-Russian Poles too sent 
a letter to İstanbul, repudiating the letter of the Hetman. As a result the Ottomans 
decided at this stage to adopt a policy of wait-and-see.124 
 Seeing no proper support, along with Radziwills and Potockis, Branicki 
family decided to support Jan Klemens Branicki, the Grand Hetman of the Crown 
for the Polish throne against pro-Russian Czartoryski’s, candidate, Stanislas 
August Poniatowski.125 In April 1764, the Convocation Sejm met to choose the 
future king of Poland. Yet, the Russian troops whose presence was requested by 
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Czartoryski’s in order to support Poniatowski’s candidature, were rapidly sent the 
rival candidate and his supporter away. Branicki had to seek refuge in Hungary, 
while Radziwill fled to the Ottoman Empire.126 Catherine, ironically, was thanked 
by some members of Szlachta for defending Polish liberties. Catherine 
congratulated Panin “on the king we have made”.127 In September 13, 
Poniatowski signed the pacta conventa and he was crowned In November 25. The 
coronation took place, for the first time, in Warsaw, strangely enough, on Saint 
Catherine’s day.128 
 Russia and Prussia immediately recognized Poniatowski’s election, 
whereas France declared that so long as the Ottoman Empire did not recognize 
Poniatowski as the legitimate king of Poland, France would not do so either.129 In 
the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, the result of the elections was not 
welcomed at all. Nor was the newly appointed Polish envoy to the Porte. The 
Polish envoy, who was meant to announce Poniatowski’s victory, was held in 
abeyance for a long time before being allowed to enter İstanbul.130 It took Austria 
almost a year to recognize Poniatowski as the legitimate king of Poland, and it 
was possible largely thanks to the connections of his brother, Andrzej 
Poniatowski, who was serving in the Austrian army at that time.131 
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4.3 Poniatowski, Reforms and the Dissident Question 
 
Poniatowski had been born in 1732. Through his mother, he was one of the 
influential Czartoryskis known in Poland simply as “The Family". He found the 
Szlachta generally dull, provincial and stupid. In 1755, he managed to escape 
from his surroundings, going to Russia, as Polish minister-plenipotentiary and 
there, thanks to his friend Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, the British envoy at St. 
Petersburg, he met the young Grand Duchess Catherine for the first time, whose 
official lover he quickly became.132 This love affair was to have a dire impact on   
future Polish-Russian relations. Russia would become pro-Czartoryski and the 
Czartoryskis would be pro-Russian. He returned to Poland three years later and 
did not meet her again face to face for another 30 years.133 
 Soon after his election, Poniatowski, in the early days of his reign, contrary 
to popular belief that he was merely a Russian puppet, surprised everyone with his 
reforming spirit.134 Even the envoy of the Papal nuncio to Poland observed that 
Poniatowski possessed “a burning desire to reform the whole country in one day –
if only he could- and the entire nation, in order to bring it up to the level of other, 
more advanced nations”.135 He very well understood the sources of the 
inefficiency of the Polish state: Firstly, weak centralization of the government due 
to the Szlachta’s liberum veto, and secondly, the lack of a strong, standing army. 
He could not abolish the liberum veto because he did not have an army to fight 
against its defenders. At the same time because he could not get rid of the liberum 
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veto, he could not establish a strong army. It was a vicious cycle that had to be 
broken.136 
 The Polish army had less than 20000 troops ready to serve, a tiny number 
compared to its neighbors. Russia had around 300,000; Austria around 200,000; 
and Prussia around 200,000.137 In order to reform the army, the Szkola Rycerska, 
literally ‘College of Chivalry’, the first entirely secular state-run academy for the 
training of administrative and military cadres, was established by Poniatowski on 
15 March 1765 and it operated until the final partition of Poland, 1795. The very 
first of its students included Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who would later shine during 
the Kosciuszko uprising against the partitioning powers. The Academy was the 
first step towards the projected establishment of a strong Polish army to fight 
against the defenders of the liberum veto. 138 
 When the first Sejm of Poniatowski’s reign convened in 1766, the 
abolition of the liberum veto was on the agenda, but, due to the vested interests in 
the Szlachta, the abolition of the liberum veto was rejected. After all, “how could 
one abolish the liberum veto without someone exercising the liberum veto?”139 
The reforms tending towards the abolishment of the liberum veto were against the 
very spirit of the Russo – Prussian agreement of 1764. Both Prussia and Russia 
needed the liberum veto to keep their neighbor in a constant state of controllable 
chaos. According to Frederick with the abolition of the liberum veto, Poland might 
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become a power dangerous to its neighbors.140 The Dissidents’ access to political 
rights was important for Russia in order to create a strong party in Poland to be 
relied on.141 This political aim was Russia’s chief motive in raising the Dissident 
question, which was clearly reflected in Panin’s instruction of Repnin in 1767, 
August: 
 
It is necessary to resolve the Dissident affairs not for the sake of 
propagating our faith and the Protestant in Poland, but for the sake of 
acquiring for ourselves, through our co-religionists and the 
Protestants, a firm and reliable party with the legal right to participate 
in all the affairs of Poland.142  
 
 
 
 To this end a Protestant Confederation was proclaimed at Thorn with 
Russian and Prussian support and an Orthodox one in Slupsk in early 1767. In late 
1767, another confederation in Radom emerged, which gradually spread into a 
countrywide General Confederation comprising around 80,000 members of all 
shades of opinions, including ones which supported the King and others who 
wanted to dethrone him. Yet, with its wide composition, the aims of the General 
Confederation were far from clear, as also was the future of Poland.143 The 
Republic was dragged into a bloody civil war. 
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4.4 The Cardinal Laws 
 
In order to deal with the unrest, an extraordinary meeting of the Sejm was called 
in February 1768. Far from appeasing the fighting parties, the decisions of the 
1768 Sejm increased the brutality of the on-going civil war. “The Cardinal Laws”, 
prawa kardynalne, as they were called, confirmed the nobility’s monopoly in 
Polish politics, further confirmed that royal elections should be free and strictly 
rejected the abolition of the liberum veto. In addition, the Dissidents were granted 
freedom of worship and more importantly, the right to hold public offices. Russia 
and Poland signed a “Perpetual Treaty” comprising these “Cardinal Laws” and 
gave Russia the right to extend for all time its guarantee to maintain the 
constitution of Poland and its freedom. With this agreement, Poland was more 
firmly than ever under Russian control. “Polish Anarchy” was safe in Catherine’s 
hands. As the Empress wrote to her ambassador in Warsaw, Repnin, as long as 
Russia had the means of using the liberum veto, nothing that the Poles did 
mattered.144 
 Yet, Catherine’s knowledge of Church – state relations in Poland, and that 
of her chief advisor Panin, was very superficial and limited. What had appeared to 
be the moment of Russsian triumph was actually one which exposed its real 
failure. They could not foresee that The Dissident confederation would be 
countered by a Catholic one.145 
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4.5 The Formation of the Bar Confederation 
 
A number of nobles rejected the legality of the Sejm’s decisions on the Dissidents 
and formed a new Confederation at the town of Bar in Podolia on February 28, 
1768, with the aim of defending the Catholic faith and driving the Russians out of 
Poland.146 Putting aside their political preferences, many rival families of the 
Szlachta, like Potocki, Spieha and Krasinski, came together to fight against the 
Russians. The manifesto of the Bar Confederation, written by Krasinski, stated 
that “We, the Councils of the Dignitaries (…) assemble to deliver the country, the 
faith, the liberties and the national laws and freedom from impending ruin”.147 
This unification of the various different shades of political opinions under one 
banner, fighting against a common foreign enemy might be considered as an early 
nationalist reaction and the starting point of modern Polish nationalism.148 
 The Bar Confederates were very well aware of their military shortcomings 
against their strong enemy and were looking abroad for military and diplomatic 
support, in France, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. France encouraged the Porte 
by sending a huge sum of money for it to declare war on Russia.149 The Austrian 
empress, Maria Theresa, chose not to interfere in Polish affairs. The Confederates 
asked several times for the support of neighboring Turkish leaders. Nevertheless, 
they were replied that their pleas for help would not be met until they could 
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produce a unified organization.150 
 Even though the Confederates began their struggle with certain 
advantages, things did not go as well as planned. A Confederation attempt to 
kidnap Poniatowski in order to dethrone him failed, due to the fact that the 
kidnappers lost their way soon after they succeeded in kidnapping the King. One 
of its members had second thoughts about what they were doing and allowed the 
King to escape.151 This almost-successful attempt to kidnap the King was a clear 
indication of the chaotic situation that Poland was now in and at the same time 
this farcical event led to questioning of the credibility of the Confederates. 
Anarchy was everywhere and Catherine made use of this “Polish anarchy” as a 
pretext to send more Russian troops into Poland. Yet, as the number of Russian 
soldiers increased in the Republic, so did the number of Poles, joining the Bar 
confederates. Russia lost control over Poland. 
 
4.6 The Internationalization of the Polish Civil War 
 
As other Polish provinces joined the Bar Confederation, the war spread  to the 
southern parts of Poland. At first the Ottoman Empire gave public assurances that 
it would not intervene in Polish affairs. Ottoman provincial commanders were 
instructed not to get in touch with the Confederates.152 Bitter fighting and an orgy 
of killings took place among the Confederates and the Russians, especially after 
the involvement of the Russian Cossacks in the conflict. In July 1768, a band of 
                                                 
150 Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland, 95-98; Tansel, “Osmanlı–Leh Münasebetleri 1764-
1768”, 82-83. 
151 Bain, The Last King of Poland, 117-118. 
152 Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland, 99. 
48 
 
Cossacks crossed into Crimean territory, in pursuit of Polish confederates and 
attacked the town of Balta. Aleksey Mikhailovic Obreskov, the Russian 
ambassador to Turkey, urged Prince Nikolay Repnin, the Russian ambassador to 
Poland, to put an end to the Confederate affair in order to stay on good terms with 
the Porte. After all, it was Repnin, who was responsible for the fate of Poland, not 
Poniatowski. Yet, his pleas to stop the violence fell on deaf ears.153 The Porte 
issued an ultimatum to Russia demanding the evacuation of Poland, the 
withdrawal of the Russian guarantee of the Polish constitution and of Russian 
protection for the dissidents.154 When the Russian envoy Obreskov declared that 
his government could not meet the demands of the ultimatum155, he was locked up 
in the fort of the Yedikule in 8 October 1768156 -  the equivalent of a declaration of 
war, according to the Turkish practice of international law. 157
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
WAR, BALANCE AND PARTITION 
 
 
 
“The declaration of war surprised and disconcerted all men – the 
Turks who had made it, the Russians who had provoked it, the French 
who had prompted it, the Prussians who had discouraged it, the 
Austrians who had lived in perpetual dread of it, even the English who 
pretended to be indifferent to it”. 
 
Albert Sorel158 
 
 
5.1 The Russo – Turkish War of 1768 – 1774 
 
The Turkish declaration of war on Russia was a turning point in the history of 
Eastern Europe. The civil war in Poland transcended the boundaries of the 
Republic and thus internationalized the nature of the Polish problem. Russia, 
having failed to supress the rebellion in Poland, now had to deal with another 
problem, which would shatter the balance in the region. 
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 Obviously, the Russo – Turkish war affected more than just those two 
countries. European countries dreaded the possibility that the conflict might 
spread to whole continent, in a way similar to the Seven Years’ War. Great Britain 
immediately offered its good offices for mediation.159 Nor did Austria want war. 
Maria Theresa would have been sorry to see the Turks victorious, yet, she also did 
not wish to see Catherine more powerful than she herself was.160 Every single 
possible outcome of the war was against Austria. Friedrich desired peace no less 
than did Maria Theresa. Even though his scheme of Prussian expansion, including 
designs on Polish Prussia, still existed theoretically, he expressed no desire to go 
to war to obtain these ends.161 
 The Turkish declaration of war over the Polish question was considered to 
be real stupidity162 and also ignorance163 by some. After all the Cossack razing of 
the city of Balta had not been done  on Russia’s directive or aims in mind and 
Russia had not desired this war since the chaos in Poland was already 
unmanageable164 and thus the peace between Russia and Turkey could have been 
maintained if the Turks had acted more cautiously.  On the other hand, the 
literature available suggests that the Polish affair was not the only reason for the 
Turkish declaration of war. The Turks had long been worried about the military 
activities of their northern neighbor. The construction and fortification of 
fortresses along the Turkish – Russian border was perceived as a sign of a future 
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Russian offensive towards the Black Sea.165 In addition, as the balance in Eastern 
Europe was already in favor of Russia, the election of the pro-Russian 
Poniatowski as king of Poland further increased the anxiety of the Ottomans about 
the safety and defense of their northern boundaries. The Polish affair was a further 
excuse for the Turks to check Russian expansionism.166 The war itself may even 
be seen as a pre-emptive strike intended to remind Russia of its territorial limits 
on the Black Sea.167 
 
5.1.1 The Beginning 
 
The Ottoman declaration of war was not a severe blow to Russia, since it took 
almost six months for the Ottoman army to mobilize fully and start the 
campaign.168 Yet, for the following months, since the war diverted Russian troops 
from Poland, Russia had difficulty fighting against both the Ottomans and the Bar 
Confederates. 
 The Turkish campaign towards the Balkans or on the Black Sea was a 
great relief for the Poles, since the Ottoman advance meant the concentration of 
the Russian  forces away from the Polish plains. The Ottomans provided a means 
of counterbalance against Poland's eastern and western neighbours.169 So the 
Turkish war temporarily took the pressure off Poland causing the loosening of the 
Russian grip upon the Republic. Thanks to the Russo–Turkish War, the Bar 
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Confederates had the upper hand in their fight against Russia within Poland and 
along the Russian border.170  
 
5.2 The Polish Anarchy and Precautions of Austria and Prussia 
 
Yet, things were not the same on the Austrian border. The Confederates were 
losing one battle after another. While being chased by the Russians, they often had 
to seek refuge in a neighboring country. Austria, knowing the causes of the 
outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, took precautions in February 1769 to avoid 
the war approaching its borders.171 Austria’s border with Poland and the Ottoman 
Empire was ill defined but the Austrians were quick to invade and plant their 
eagles at points wherever the ownership of the lands was doubtful and the county 
of Zips was one of these contested territories, which had been ceded to Poland in 
1412.172 
 The Austrian occupation of Zips gave Frederick the opportunity he desired 
to advance his designs upon Poland. Yet, at first, his efforts to push Russia to 
agree to a partition of Poland proved futile. Count Victor von Solms, his envoy in 
St. Petersburg, reported that Russia had no designs of conquest in any direction 
and the preservation of Poland was really held dear at heart at the Russian 
Court.173 
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5.3 The Russian Victories & The Balance of Power Spoilt 
 
The Russo-Turkish War was a fight between “the one-eyed and the blind” as it 
was well put by Frederick II, as neither side was ready for a war.174 The Ottomans 
started the war with several advantages. They still controlled the Crimea and the 
Black Sea, which provided easy entry into Russian territory from the south, plus, 
enabling them to choose landing and supply points.175 Yet, in the Ukraine, the 
Danube valley and the Crimea, the Ottomans suffered a series of major defeats. In 
September, Hotin fell, followed in November by Bogdan, and then in February 
1770 by Wallachia. 176  
 The naval battles were no different. The Russian navy was also successful 
in action, despite the fact that the eastern Baltic was Russia’s only access route to 
the sea. Russia negotiated its first foreign loans to finance the Mediterranean 
expedition.177 Thanks to the transportation of the Baltic fleet into the Aegean via 
Gibraltar, under their able admiral Aleksey Orlov, who had absolutely no previous 
experience of naval command, the Russians were successful in the sea battles 
too.178 The Ottoman admiral Mandalzade Hüsamettin Pasha was outmaneuvered, 
withdrawing his fleet into the harbor of Çeşme, where the entire Ottoman fleet 
was destroyed between 5th and 7th July 1770 by Russians under Count Aleksey 
Orlov with the help of fire ships. The Battle of Çeşme ranks with Lepanto and 
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Trafalgar as a naval battle which marked the course of world history and created a 
national myth. After the victory, Aleksey Orlov was allowed to add Chesmensky 
to his name.179 The Çeşme victory was Russia’s first naval victory in nine hundred 
years, and would not have been possible without British logistical help.180 In her 
correspondence with Voltaire, Catherine said that Count Orlov had reported that 
the harbor of Çeşme was stained with blood of the Turks. In commemoration of 
the triumph, she commissioned the construction of the Çeşme Palace in St. 
Petersburg.181 
 On the very same day of the Çeşme defeat, the Ottomans were severely 
defeated on the banks of Larga river too. Two weeks after the Battle of Larga, the 
battle of Kagul took place. After the Ottoman defeat in August 1770, the fortresses 
of İsmail, Kili, Bender, Akkerman fell one after another. The left bank of the 
Danube was abandoned to the Russians.182 
The Porte was left desperately looking for ways to come to terms and 
requested mediation from Vienna and Berlin.183 The already-upset balance of 
power in Eastern Europe had been upset once again, this time in favor of Russia. 
 
5.4 Balancing Politics of Austria and Prussia 
 
These almost-decisive Russian victories against the Ottomans alarmed the other 
two pillars of the Eastern European balance of power system. Neither Austria nor 
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Prussia was prepared to see Russia make unilateral gains at the expense of the 
Ottoman Empire.184 For Kaunitz, Austria had more to fear from Russia than 
Prussia. Austria was concerned about Russian gains in the Danubian principalities, 
while Prussia was anxious about the unbalancing consequences of an excessive 
growth of Russian power.185 These twin concerns brought Austria and Prussia on 
the same side. Frederick and Joseph met in the first days of September 1770 at 
Neustadt. Kaunitz too was present in the meeting and declared that Austria would 
not allow Russia beyond the Danube. Frederick seconded his views but at the 
same time denied the possibility of any kind of military action because Russia and 
Prussia were theoretically allies.186 So far, in the negotiations the Polish problem 
had hardly come up, even though it was the cause of the Russo-Turkish war.187 On 
4th of September, the Turkish request for mediation arrived.188 In order to check   
Russian expansion, the offer of mediation was accepted and conveyed to the 
Empress in the following month.189 This offer of mediation was in fact an implicit 
message to Catherine to show that Vienna and Berlin were on the same side 
against Russian expansionism. Yet, Russia, being simultaneously still victorious 
against the Turks and the Poles, was far from accepting the mediation of Austria 
and Prussia and thus allowing them to meddle in the affairs of Russia and Turkey. 
Catherine believed that the peace terms should be dictated to the Turks only by the 
Russians.190 
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5.4.1 The Prussian Stance 
 
The Prussians did not have many options regarding the Russian victories over the 
Poles and the Ottomans. They could either stop the Russians and earn their enmity 
or join the Russian bandwagon hoping to extract advantage from the chaotic 
situation in Eastern Europe. Yet, joining up with the Russians might upset the 
Austrians and thus, lead the latter to join forces with the Ottomans and the Poles, 
which might even activate one of the two main alliances in Europe191, that is to 
say,  a Franco – Austrian alliance against a Russo – Prussian one. This might then 
precipitate a general war in Europe, something which neither side desired.192 thus, 
refraining from entering into an anti-Russian alliance, Frederick decided to act 
unilaterally in Poland. Due to the plague then sweeping across Poland, Prussia 
announced that in order to protect the health of the Prussian people, Prussia would 
draw a cordon along the Polish frontier.193 Yet, even unilateral Prussian action in 
Poland did not deter the Russians from advancing against the Turks.194 Frederick, 
still remembering the battles of Zorndorf and Kunersdorf, could not risk a war 
against the Empress in order to preserve the balance of power in Eastern Europe. 
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5.4.2 The Austrian Stance 
 
Unlike Prussia, Austria did not remain still. In Kaunitz’s view Austria could never 
allow Russia to cross the Danube. The Austrians started secret negotiations with 
the Ottomans for an anti-Russian alliance in exchange for territorial 
compensation, On June 1771, Russian troops entered Orkapısı and advanced to 
the Crimea,195 which accelerated the negotiation process. The agreement was 
concluded in July 1771. According to it, Turkey was to cede Little Wallachia to 
Austria in return for the latter’s aid to the Turks in their war against the Russians. 
In the event of Russia persisting in its expansion southwards, Austria would 
undertake to intervene the war on the Ottoman side.196 Maria Theresa, hated 
Catherine so much that she referred to her as “that woman”197 and welcomed the 
rapprochement and cooperation with the Turks on the Polish question.198 For 
Kaunitz, aspects such as religious differences could not be taken into 
consideration, when Austria’s national interests were at stake.199 
 
5.5 Diplomatic Maneuvering  
 
Even though the Austrians concluded the defensive alliance with the Turks, 
neither they nor the Prussians really wanted war. Frederick’s solution was an 
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agreement to offset the threat to the balance of power in Eastern Europe posed by 
excessive Russian gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, by allowing 
Austria and Prussia a share with Russia in a partition of Poland.200 Frederick used 
the Austro-Turkish alliance as an argument to convince the Empress that Austria 
was dangerous and used the threat of a possible Prussian accord with Austria for a 
partition. He asserted that Russia could not obtain any compensation on the 
Danube without a war with Austria, suggesting that the partition of Poland was 
instead the best plan for compensating Russia for the cost of the Turkish war. 
Catherine thought that it was better for Russia to retain its hold over the whole of 
Poland.201 
 The Austrian advance and the possibility of Prussia following the same 
course did influence Catherine. The Russian Empress was alarmed by Austria’s 
threatening and belligerent attitude. Catherine, though victorious against the Turks 
and the Poles, could not afford to go to war against Austria without Prussian 
support and so, finally gave in.202    
 The Treaty of Partition was at length signed at St. Petersburg, on the 17th 
February 1772. As Frederick had foreseen, the agreement between Prussia and 
Russia forced the hand of Austria. Frederick wanted Austria to participate in the 
partition too, because he thought if Austria obtained no part of Poland and Prussia 
and Russia alone took some districts from the Poles, all the hatred of the Poles 
would be turned upon them.203 
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 Maria Theresa regarded a tripartite partition of Poland as a crime, yet, her 
Foreign Minister could not tolerate the idea of Russia and Prussia benefitting from 
the Partition without Austria.204 Pressured by her son Joseph as well, Maria 
Theresa gave in. Theresa wept because she showed consent for the partition. Yet, 
she was weeping and taking at the same time. The more she cried, the more she 
took, according to Frederick.205 
 Nevertheless, it took a full two months for the Austrians to renounce the 
treaty of alliance with the Ottomans. In April 1772, the Austrians withdrew from 
the defensive treaty.206 The Ottoman Porte, abandoned by its main ally against 
Russia, sued for peace in May 1772.207 The parties had to wait for another two 
years to conclude a decisive peace treaty, but Russia, having secured its southern 
frontier for the time being, signed the treaties of the First Partition of Poland with 
Prussia and Austria on July 25, 1772. From this moment, the First Partition was 
inevitable. 
 
5.6 The First Partition 
 
In early August, Austrian, Prussian and Russian troops simultaneously entered the 
Commonwealth and started to occupy the provinces agreed between them.   Each 
sovereign tried to prove that his country had legitimate claims to a part of Poland 
and that the seizures were only a just resumption of sovereignty. Austria went 
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back more than three hundred and fifty years to establish her claims on Poland. 
Russia had always laid claim to the greater part of Lithuania, based on the large 
Orthodox population living there. Prussia's claims were based on the conquests of 
the Teutonic Knights, and the strip of Polish territory which divided the territory 
of Prussia into two parts. The sovereigns of the partitioning powers had the 
audacity to say that the partition was for the restoration of the prosperity of 
Poland.208 
 Even though the regiments of the Bar Confederations did not lay down 
their arms, there was nothing much left that they could do against the armies of 
the three countries. In 1773, a confederated Sejm met. Its sole purpose was to 
confirm the partition treaties.209 Suitable and compliant deputies had been elected, 
who were, just in case, also sweetened by foreign money and surrounded by 
foreign troops. Only a few members of the Sejm openly opposed ratifying the 
treaty. However, nothing changed in the end. In the summer of 1773 Poniatowski 
signed the necessary documents, ceding territory to the partitioning powers. The 
First Partition was complete.210  
 All partitioning powers were satisfied with their shares. Frederick was 
elated with his success, while Kaunitz was especially happy with the large amount 
of territory Austria acquired and particularly with Wieliczka, which would enable 
Austria to have a salt monopoly in the region through its rich mines.211 Catherine 
declared that she had never signed a treaty with so much satisfaction.212 She had 
to wait for another two years before she signed another treaty with even more 
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satisfaction, this time with the Ottomans. 
 
5.7 Results of the First Partition 
 
The most obvious result of the Partition was that Poland lost some 30 per cent of 
its territory and 35 per cent of its population. The loss of control over the Lower 
Vistula, Poland's trade route to the Baltic coast and to the outside world, was very 
serious for trade and the economy.213 
 Prussia gained Warmia, Kujawy and northern parts of Wielkopolska 
exluding Gdańsk and Toruń, 36.000 square kilometres with 580.000 inhabitants; 
Austria annexed Zator, Oświęcim, Sandomierz, Bochnia, Wieliczka, Galicia and 
some parts of Małopolska, 83.000 square kilometres with 2.650.000 inhabitants; 
and Russia took Witebsk, Polock, Mscislaw, as far as the rivers Dvina and 
Dnieper,  92.000 square kilometres with 1.300.000 inhabitants.  
      The three powers derived not only different amounts of land and population, 
but also contrasting advantages and benefits which had been carefully considered 
by the three Powers at the negotiating table. Prussia’s smaller share should not be 
allowed to overshadow the fact that it received the most commercially important 
part of Poland, whereas Russia got the largest portion and Austria – the most 
populous.214 Prussia's share, although the smallest, was the one which was most 
valuable to its new ruler. Not only did it contain the most economically developed 
areas, but also it gave Prussia control of much of the important commercial 
waterway of the Vistula. It also created the desired land bridge between East 
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Prussia and the rest of the kingdom linking Brandenburg to East Prussia. 
Frederick's primary ambition had been realized.215 
 Because Prussia needed the Polish territories of West Prussia to 
consolidate its existing territory Russia had earlier had a growing fear that Prussia 
might proceed to a unilateral annexation of part of Poland. This and the war with 
the Ottomans, had obliged Russia to take part in the Partition. Though it was at 
heart opposed to any kind of partition, Austria could not afford to be at a 
disadvantage with respect to the others, if the balance of power was to be 
maintained.216 
 Russia in many ways could be said to have gained the least. Instead of 
maintaining an undivided large state as its satellite, Russia now had to hare its 
exclusive influence over Poland with two Germanic states. The first partition, at 
the same time, was a step closer towards having common frontiers with 
formidable neighbors as Prussia and Austria, as it started the process of the 
dissolution of a buffer state.217 
 
5.8 The End of the War and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
 
Between 1771 and 1773, Catherine had also to cope with the Turkish War, the 
plague in Moscow, the coup of Gustavus III in Sweden and the Pugachev 
rebellion.218 Yet, she showed great unwillingness to finish the war until she 
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achieved her aims in the Crimea, even if “the war lasted for another ten years”.219 
The most important Russian success was the occupation of the Crimea. Its ruler, 
Selim Giray Khan, escaped to the Ottoman Empire, leaving his successor to begin 
negotiations with Russia. In the following year, a treaty recognizing the nominal 
independence of the Crimea was signed. The treaty gave Russia the right to 
maintain garrisons in a number of Black Sea ports, including Kerch and 
Yenikale.220 
 In January 1774, the death of Sultan Mustafa III altered the situation and 
military operations came to an end after a Russian army crossed the Danube and 
captured the main Ottoman army camp at Shumen. Field-Marshal Aleksander 
Suvorov proved to be a brilliant commander, indeed one of the greatest generals in 
Russian history.  The title  of “Zadunaysky”, meaning “beyond the Danube”, was 
conferred on Pyotr Rumyantsev, the governor-general of Little Russia, to 
commemorate his exploits in Bulgaria which culminated in the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca.221 Peace had been achieved through military means. The Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca was signed on 21 July 1774. 222 Catherine considered this day 
“one of the most fortunate in my [her] life, when the Empire has obtained the 
peace it so badly needed”.223 
 It was a resounding military and diplomatic defeat for the Ottomans, 
marking the formal beginning of the Empire’s decline on the world stage and the 
loss of important territory, ending its dominance over the Black Sea and the Straits 
of Azov. The independence of the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire was accepted. 
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Russian ships were granted the right of free navigation on the Black Sea and free 
passage through the Dardanelles. Article 7 was to prove the most important of the 
treaty. It was so ambiguously worded that it was later interpreted by Russian 
diplomats as giving them the right to speak and act on behalf of the Orthodox 
population anywhere in the Ottoman Empire.224 
 The First Partition of Poland and the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca seemed to 
put an end to the turmoil in Eastern Europe. In fact, it was just the beginning of 
chaos. Severely defeated by the Russians, the Ottomans would aim to recover the 
Crimea from Russia in the following years, whereas Catherine would start 
consolidating her gains on the shores of the Black Sea and Eastern Europe. 
Poland, on the other hand, would realize the fact that the country did not have the 
best administration system in the world and thus, start a reform program, which 
would alarm its neighbors leading them to further partitions and the eventual 
destruction of the Republic in the following two decades. In 1795, Poland would 
be wiped from the political map of Europe and its resurrection would take more 
than a century. The legate of Lechistan had to wait for 129 years to come back to 
Turkey. This time, the legate was to arrive not to İstanbul - but to Ankara. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
“Vous ne sauriez empêcher qu'ils ne vous engloutissent; faites au 
moins qu’ils ne puissent digérer”. 
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau225 
 
 
In a Europe of assertive national states mostly ruled by royal autocrats, Poland 
was perhaps doomed from early in the century. It lacked the cohesion and the 
institutions (e.g. a strong monarchy, civil service, and army) which enabled the 
large countries of Europe to assert themselves. It was also the victim of its own 
geographical situation, stuck between three strong autocratic states, one of which 
had an obvious advantage in taking territory from it.  The Prussians because of 
their interest in West Prussia seem to have envisaged partition or at least the 
acquisition of territory, which under the circumstances implied partition since it
                                                 
225
 “You may not prevent them from swallowing you up; see to it at least that they will not be 
able to digest you”; Jean-Jacques Rousseau,  Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, 
et sur sa reformation projettée, (Paris: A Londres, 1782), 16. 
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could not be done alone, half a century before it actually happened. 
 After the Silent Sejm of 1717, Poland lost much of its sovereignty and 
turned into a Russian protectorate—the only way to hold off a potential threat 
from Prussia. Not surprisingly Poland’s vassal status did not diminish 
significantly throughout the wars of the 18th century, because, as a weak 
protectorate, it was never itself a leading military power in a position to enjoy 
gains from victory in war. On the contrary, especially after the War of Polish 
Succession, Russian control over Poland grew. The Russian envoys to Poland 
were more powerful in Polish internal affairs than the Polish kings, who in effect 
were acting almost as a Russian Minister of State in charge of Polish affairs. With 
the accession of Stanislas August Poniatowski, one of Catherine’s ex-favourites, 
Russian supremacy over Poland was further consolidated. 
 That being the case, it is in a sense remarkable that in the decade  after 
Poniatowski’s accession to the Polish throne, Poland, despite being firmly under 
Russian domination with the protection that this should have implied, was 
partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria. One of the main reasons why the 
partition occurred was of course the weakness of the Polish central authority. At 
the background of this was the notorious way in which Polish Kings were elected 
from 1573 on and the fact that the King no longer even had to be Polish. Polish 
elections for the monarchy thus turned into an arena for a foreign struggle for 
influence in the region. 
 Intertwined with the decline of the monarchy, was another factor, 
weakening Polish central authority, the steadily increasing independence of the 
Szlachta in Polish politics. The Szlachta demanded more concessions through 
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Pacta Conventa from each king that was elected. The Szlachta, having secured its 
“Golden Freedoms” as the liberum veto and the right to maintain private armies, 
did not relinquish its privileges and blocked any attempts towards abolishing its 
privileged status in the society by forming armed confederations and fighting 
against the government and thus, keeping the country in a constant state of chaos. 
 Another important factor rendering Poland open to foreign intervention 
was the existence of non-Catholic elements in Polish society. Social, political and 
economical rights of the dissidents were limited in Poland  and their status in 
Poland was an excuse for Prussia and Russia to intervene into the internal affairs 
of Poland on the grounds of the protection and restoration of the Dissidents’ 
rights.  
 Though important for understanding the first phase of the partition 
process, the above mentioned factors are not enough by themselves to explain 
why the partition happened. Though Poland was a very weak state compared to its 
neighbors, it did not partition itself even if it exposed itself to the danger. A 
careful examination of the policies of the partitioning powers towards Poland 
prior to the partition reveals further factors determining the partition process.   
 One was that the protection it enjoyed as a de facto  Russian protectorate 
ceased to work in the middle of the century because of a combination of events in 
the region. Why did this happen when two out of three of its neighbours were not 
originally interested in abolishing it? 
 The role of Russian supremacy over Poland especially after pro-Russian 
Poniatowski’s accession to the Polish thone has already been already mentioned. 
Poland  initially served as an important buffer state, protecting Russia against 
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Prussia and Austria. Exclusive Russian influence over Poland further  limited the 
activities of Austria and Prussia in the region. Thus, the partitioning of Poland was 
not on the agenda of Russia. Even after the formation of the Bar Confederation 
and the Polish Civil War, it was still in Russia’s best interest to keep Poland weak 
but united. A partition would bring an end to exclusive Russian supremacy inside 
Poland, something which Russia was not willing to share it with other powers in 
the region.  
 Poland’s other large neighbour, Austria, just like Russia, was against a 
Polish partition   from the start. Even though Austrian efforts in the Polish election 
of 1764 to secure the crown for its candidate proved futile, Poland was still a 
Catholic country and acted as a balancing factor against Protestant Prussia and 
Orthodox Russia. In addition, Poland, as a buffer state did not just protect Russia 
from Prussia and Austria, but at the same time, it was a barricade, limiting 
Russian influence in the region. Furthermore, after the devastating effects of the 
Seven Years’ Wars, Austria did not have any resources to allocate on another 
costly war. Unfriendly towards Prussia and cynical of Russia, it seemed 
impossible for Austria to join the team partition of Poland. 
 Unlike Austria and Russia, Prussia did have strong reasons for partitioning 
the Republic which were considered in the previous chapter.  It was conspiring to 
expand eastwards in order to unite the scattered lands of the Prussian realm. 
Central Prussia and East  Prussia did not have a land link, and for a truly strong 
Prussia to come into being, these lands had to be joined. This created a delicate 
contest between Prussia and Poland, turning the Baltic region into a kind of a 
zero-sum game for both powers. After all, any Prussian gain could only mean 
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Polish loss. Nevertheless, as with Austria, Prussia, after the Seven Years’ Wars, 
did not have sufficient resources to realize its dreams through an armed adventure. 
It would be, at the same time, a dangerous game for Prussia to play if it tried to 
expand at the expense of a state which was already under Russian influence. 
 Given the international conjuncture and the initial stance of the 
partitioning powers towards Poland, we argue that the partition took place due to 
an irreversible change in the balance between the three partitioning Powers. The 
Russian intervention into Polish affairs on behalf of the Dissidents provoked the 
formation of a reactionary proto-nationalist movement, the Bar Confederation, 
which caused a civil war in Poland. The civil war spread to the Ottoman Empire 
and thus internationalized the nature of the Polish problem, leading to a Russo-
Turkish war.  
 The Russian victories were followed by an expansion at the expense of the 
Ottoman Empire which further threatened the balance in the region. Complicated 
short term interactions in power politics in Eastern Europe are thus the reason for 
the partition of Poland. Russia was so successful in the war against Turkey that 
Austria was alarmed for its position. Frederick the Great proposed the partition of 
a part of Poland as a way to satisfy Catherine’s expansionist ambitions and at the 
same time to provide some kind of a balance in favor of Austria. This radical 
change in the international balance of power brought Austria and Prussia together 
against Russia. Austria approached the Porte and concluded an alliance against 
Russia. Prussia started an offensive against Poland on the pretext of creating a 
cordon sanitare. Russia could not risk both a war against Prussia in Poland and 
also against Austria supported by the Ottoman Empire, so had to give up  
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temporarily its aim to obtain acquisitions in the Balkans and  also  gave its 
consent to share its exclusive influence in Poland with Austria and Prussia. With 
the conclusion of the partition treaty, Austria and Prussia were no longer a threat 
to Russia, something which enabled Russia to concentrate its forces on the 
Ottoman Empire and to finish the war in the following two years. 
 The first partition brought Poland enthusiasm for reform in the 
government. This reforming spirit of Poland created anxiety among its neighbors, 
forcing them to take measures against the Republic, which were two further 
partitions, until the total demise of the Republic. It would take 123 years for the 
Rzeczpospolita to rise again like a phoenix, something which would become 
possible only with another balancing game in Eastern Europe on the course of the 
First World War. 
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